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Abstract
This paper shows that a signiﬁcant part of measured total factor productivity (TFP) diﬀer-
ences across countries is attributable not to technological factors that aﬀect the entire economy
neutrally, but rather, to variations in the structural composition of economies. In particular,
the allocation of scarce inputs between agriculture and non-agriculture is important. We pro-
vide a framework which maps the composition of the economy to measured aggregate TFP.
A decomposition analysis suggests that as much as 85 percent of the international variation
in TFP can be attributed to the composition of output. Estimation exercises indicate that
recent ﬁndings of the conduciveness of good institutions, and, to some extent trade, on levels
of TFP, may be thus explained.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The problem of economic development is often viewed as a problem of structural change. For
economists such as William Arthur Lewis, the central problem of development was to be solved by
ensuring that agriculture continued to maintain its production levels while workers moved to the
nascent industrial sector. In similar vein, other classical theories of economic development such
as those of Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow, 1961), the Big Push ( Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943)
or the Critical Minimum Eﬀort Thesis (Leibenstein, 1960) essentially viewed the problem as one
of poor countries being stuck in a poverty trap characterized by a “backward” agricultural sector
and the challenge being one of ensuring a transition to modern industrial production.1
A recent outgrowth of the new growth theory has been increasing evidence suggesting that
diﬀerences in living standards can be overwhelmingly accounted for by diﬀerences in total factor
productivity (TFP), and not diﬀerences in the stocks of raw labor, human capital and physical
capital. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) were the initial studies
suggesting that diﬀerences in TFP might account for more than 60% of the diﬀerences in output
per worker. Not surprisingly, this has led to an increasing focus on explaining diﬀerences in TFP,
often taken to mean technology, rather than factor accumulation.
In this paper we attempt to build a bridge between these recent developments and the more long-
standing view that aggregate productivity is intimately related to the process of structural change.
To achieve this end, we begin by undertaking a novel accounting exercise. The approach builds
on a relatively mild set of assumptions beyond what is standard in the literature on development
accounting. Essentially we only need to invoke national income accounting identities and the
assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function for the non-agricultural sector of the economy.
On this basis we demonstrate how aggregate TFP levels, obtained using the standard cross-country
development accounting methodology, can be further decomposed into a contribution from the
composition of output and a contribution from the (non-agrarian) level of technology. The key
ﬁnding is that the composition eﬀect can explain as much as 85% of the diﬀerences in aggregate
TFP across countries.
M u c hc a r es h o u l db et a k e ni ni n t e r p r e t i n gt h i sﬁnding. For example, it should not necessarily
be taken to imply that technology is unimportant for observed TFP diﬀerences. Accounting work
never yields insights into what, at a deeper level, generates the observed variation in factors of
production, and in this case, the composition of output. But the ﬁnding strongly suggest that
determinants of the allocation of scarce resources across sectors (technological or otherwise) are
likely to be important determinants of observed diﬀerences in aggregate GDP per worker, consistent
with the classical approach to development economics cited above. By extension, our results also
suggest that a reasonable theory of aggregate TFP diﬀerences should be based on a multi-sectoral
approach.
1This literature spawned a sizable neoclassical growth literature on dual economies. See e.g. Jorgenson (1961),
Dixit (1970) , Razin and Mass-Colell (1973). More recent contributions include Laitner (2000) and Gollin, Parente
and Rogerson (2002, 2004) and Banerjee and Duﬂo (2004).
2In the second half of this paper we investigate what might explain the empirically observed
variation in composition by way of regression analysis. Inspired by the recent literature which might
be put under the heading:“fundamental determinants of productivity” (e.g. Hall and Jones; 1999;
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Alcála and Ciccone,
2004), we examine the importance of factors such as institutional quality, trade and geographic
circumstances for the allocation of resources across sectors. We do not attempt to gauge which of
these factors is “the more important one” in understanding productivity diﬀerences. Instead, we
are solely interested in taking a ﬁrst pass at studying how the variation in inter-sectoral allocations,
which seem to account for the bulk of the variation in aggregate TFP levels, comes about. Our
estimates, based on both ordinary least squares and also after correcting for simultaneity bias,
overwhelmingly suggest that the beneﬁcial eﬀects both institutions and trade seem to have on
aggregate TFP are channeled through sectoral allocations of inputs and technological diﬀerences
across sectors.
The present paper is related to the literature on development accounting which was pioneered by
Krueger (1968) and King and Levine (1994). However, in our work we attempt to move beyond the
standard approach, where GDP can be seen as being generated by combining aggregate stocks of
capital (human and physical), an index of technology, and a neoclassical (typically, Cobb-Douglas)
production function.
In abandoning what is essentially a one-sector approach, this paper is related to an emerging
literature which analyses the implications of intersectoral reallocations for long-run productivity.
The work of Graham and Temple (2004) shows how externalities in the non-agrarian sector may lead
to multiple steady states in terms of aggregate productivity.2 Other contributions have in a similar
vein examined the aggregate consequences of misallocation of inputs due to e.g. barriers to capital
accumulation (Restuccia, 2004), Harris-Todaro type wage gaps (Temple, 2003), imperfections in
factor markets (Vollrath, 2004) and the role of ﬁxed costs (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2004).
The contribution most directly related to our accounting work is that of Caselli (2004) who
also provides a development accounting analysis of the importance of inter-sectoral allocations of
input across agriculture and non-agricultural sectors of the economy. Caselli’s methodology can be
viewed as a “bottom-up” approach to the issue at hand, which consists of specifying disaggregated
production functions (in agriculture and outside agriculture) upon which counterfactuals are per-
formed so as to assess the importance of intersectoral diﬀerences in TFPs, capital-output ratios
etc, for aggregate labor productivity. In contrast, our methodology can be viewed as a “top-down”
approach to the issue of how intersectoral allocations matter for TFP diﬀerences. The key distin-
guishing feature in the two approaches lie in that we do not make assumptions about the nature
of the underlying production technology in agriculture. The main advantage is that it dispenses
with the need for making assumptions about e.g. inputs and factor intensities in the agricultural
2The diﬀerent steady states can be ranked according to the size of the agricultural sector; “high” income per
capita is associated with relatively few resources being devoted to agriculture. They also demonstrate, by way of
calibration, how their approach can motivate a “twin peaked” distribution of aggregate TFP, a result which ﬁts
with the empirical ﬁndings of Feyrer (2002).
3production function, which remains a somewhat controversial issue. Of course, the drawback of our
approach is that it is not informative about disaggregated TFP diﬀerences, whereas e.g. Caselli’s
approach is. In this sense our work complements Caselli’s.
Overall, the present paper can be viewed as providing an assessment of the scope for inter-
sectoral diﬀerences (attributable to underlying sources such as those mentioned above) to explain
diﬀerences in aggregate productivity. Our ﬁndings, while not placing one of the above mentioned
approaches above another, suggests that a strong case can be made in favor of theories for aggregate
TFP diﬀerences that are grounded in dual economy type frameworks.
2 Accounting
We begin by invoking the national income identity which states that nominal GDP, pY ,c o n s t i t u t e s
the sum of nominal value added in the agricultural sector (paYa) and the non agricultural sector
(pnaYna):







Accordingly, p is the GDP deﬂator (suitably deﬁned) whereas pi,i= a,na is the price of agricultural
and non-agricultural goods, respectively. Further, if we denote nominal labor productivity by lower
case letters (e.g. ya = paYa/La), and the respective sectoral labor force shares by λi,i = a,na,













Hence, aggregate labor productivity can be viewed as a multiple of labor productivity in non-
agriculture.
In order to proceed we need to impose some additional structure. Hence, our key assumption










Since by deﬁnition the aggregate capital-output ratio, K/Y, and average economy-wide skill level,
h, is proportional to the corresponding levels in the non-agricultural sector, i.e. Kna
Yna ≡ κK
Y and




















Obviously, the allocations κ,η are bounded from above, such that κ ∈ (0,κ) and η ∈ (0,¯ η).
Now, consider the standard decomposition of aggregate labor productivity. Assuming the exis-
tence of an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function such an exercise consists of decomposing
























This suggests that the numbers calculated by e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall
and Jones (1999) may mask an important contribution stemming from the intersectoral allocation
of scarce inputs. Of course, at the same time, they may not. If average labor productivity is about
t h es a m ei nt h et w os e c t o r s
ya
yna ≈ 1, marginal costs are roughly the same (so that under competitive
markets pa ≈ pna) and the factor intensities across sectors are roughly equalized (suggesting the
absence of barriers to factor mobility, so that κ ≈ η ≈ 1), then aggregate total factor productivity
would trivially equal the total factor productivity in the non-agricultural sector: TFP = Ana. One
could reasonable expect this to be the case in OECD countries where capital-output ratios and
levels of labor productivity seems to be roughly similar across sectors.3
These considerations induce us to split equation (5) into two parts:
TFP = COMP ∗ Ana (6)













Our aim is to see how much of the variation in the TFP can be accounted for by COMP and Ana,
respectively. If a signiﬁcant portion of aggregate TFP reﬂects variations in composition eﬀects then
clearly one can conclude that intersectoral diﬀerences are important in understanding the source
of TFP diﬀerences. On the other hand if these diﬀerences seem unimportant then it appears that
TFP diﬀerences are caused by factors that aﬀect individual sectors roughly symmetrically. That
is, factors that do not entail a reallocation of inputs across sector nor change relative levels of
productivity in any substantive way.
While the methodology above may seem straightforward, data poses a challenge. The main
concern is obviously that of international comparability. Speciﬁcally, internationally comparable
data at the sectoral level is required. In addition we need intersectoral capital-output ratios, and
intersectoral human capital levels. In the rest of this section we discuss how we try to overcome
these obstacles and present our results.
To reconcile our decomposition with existing work on development accounting we need to
produce PPP shares of agriculture value added in GDP. With such numbers in hand we can obtain
PPP shares of non-agriculture value added in GDP using PPP GDP numbers from Penn World
Tables (PWT) and proceed to calculate average labor productivity in the two sectors, (ya,y na)
using labor share data from World Development Indicators.
3In their analysis of sectoral convergence of worker productivities and TFP in developed economies, Bernard and
Jones (1996), ﬁnd that the worker productivity in the agricultural sector lies within the same band as manufacturing
and services in 1987, with the exception of Japan which has a relatively low agricultural productivity (See ﬁgure 2
in Bernard and Jones).
5Fortunately, FAO constructs a set of international prices on agricultural commodities at an
annual frequency. Rao (1993) used this data to construct cross-country data on agriculture value
added, though only for 1985.4 It would seem that by combining Rao’s work with data from PWT
we would obtain the shares we need for 1985. As Caselli (2004) observes, however, the FAO
numbers cannot readily be subtracted from aggregate PWT numbers in 1985 to get PPP value
added for the rest of the economy. The reason is that while PPP data for aggregate prices is
normalized to 1 for the US in the PWT, PPP data for agricultural prices is normalized to 1 for the
US in the FAO data. Of course, nothing guarantees that the implicit PWT PPP exchange rate for
agriculture should be 1. Accordingly, we need to “renormalize” the FAO numbers.
In doing so we follow a method suggested by Caselli (2004). The key observation is that since
PPP prices are quantity weighted, they tend to resemble rich country prices. Accordingly, one
may expect that the PPP agricultural share of GDP should be approximately equal to the nominal









In this expression, the right hand side fraction (nominal share of agriculture) is available from
World Development Indicators. The denominator on the left hand side is PPP GDP from the
Penn World Tables. Accordingly, we can solve for pPPP
A,USY PPP








where the superscript FAO denotes the FAO numbers. Multiplying all FAO PPP numbers on
agriculture value added by s should make them comparable to PWT’s GDP numbers for 1985.
With comparable PPP numbers on GDP and GDP in agriculture in hand we can calculate the
non agricultural GDP shares as well. Using employment shares (λa,λ na) from World Development
Indicators we can compute PPP numbers on labor productivity in the two sectors, ya and yna.5
Another input in our decomposition analysis is aggregate TFP numbers. Since value added for
agriculture is available only for 1985, our accounting exercise will also be for 1985. In performing
the basic development accounting analysis, we follow Hall and Jones (1999) (henceforth, HJ).
Since HJ considered 1988 we have to redo their calculations. As HJ used 1985 numbers for human
capital this bit of input data will be the same. The capital-output ratios for 1985 were calculated
by replicating the HJ methodology exactly. Finally, invoking data on real GDP per worker from
PWT version 5.6 we calculate TFP for 1985 as the residual in equation (4).6 Below, we refer to
these numbers as HJ-TFP.7
Turning next to the relative price pna/p. Once we move to PPP numbers, rather than nom-
inal values as assumed in the derivations above, this term becomes irrelevant for our variance
4Recently these numbers have been used by Caselli (2004) and Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2004) in their work on
calculating agricultural sector TFP’s.
5While we have followed the methodology of Caselli (2004) we have used PWT 5.6 whereas he uses PWT 6.1.
Thus the implied shares will still be diﬀerent as the two versions have diﬀerent base years. Version 5.6 uses 1985 as
the base year, which is particularly useful for us since all our calculations are done for 1985.
6Capital’s share α i sp u ta t1 / 3 .
7The correlation between our TFP numbers for 1985 and HJ’s own estimates for 1988 is 0.98.
6decomposition. To see this, consider equation (2). Measured in international prices the left
hand side would be PPP GDP per worker, Y ppp
L . We have already described how we obtain








α/(1−α) hnaAna and recognizing that pppp
na does not vary across countries, it
follows that the relative price will not matter for the variance decompositions which follow below.
This still leaves us with κ
α
1−α and η- the intersectoral allocations of capital and human capital.
Below we take these allocations into account. But adding information on capital allocations reduces
the size of the data set considerably. In addition, the numbers are probably a little more contentious







the carpet, as a ﬁrst pass.















This implies that RES1 (short for residual) picks up some of the variance in TFP which should be
attributed to the actual composition eﬀect. Whether this should increase or decrease the variation
in TFP attributable to composition eﬀects is not quite clear. To see this, note that the variance
in TFP is the sum of the variances in COMP1, κ
α










where v,u = COMP1, κ
α
1−α,η ,A na (logarithms of all these variables) and v 6= u.O n t h e o n e
hand, attributing all of the variance of κ
α
1−α and η to the residual would underestimate the share
explained by composition terms. On the other hand it is not clear exactly in which directions the
covariances will go. The covariance between η and Ana is probably likely to be positive, but there
is little that one can say about the covariance of the remaining two combinations. Despite these
limitations, it is instructive to see what the decomposition exercise between COMP1 and the rest
looks like.
Table I reports some summary statistics for HJ-TFP, COMP and RES and also agricultural
share in output (ASHARE) and worker productivity (RPROD=ya/yna). The thing to notice from
the table is the enormous variation in relative worker productivity, ranging from 0.004 (Cameroon)
to 1.44 (New Zealand). New Zealand is actually the only country that records a number higher
than 1. Most OECD countries have relative productivity at the upper end of the distribution,
but less than 1. Figure 1 plots relative productivity in ascending order. A fairly large number of





na is constant across countries, we supress it from now on.
7Table II reports the correlations between the various variables. A few of the interesting features
of this table are that HJ-TFP is strongly negatively correlated with agricultural share of output
(Ashare) and has a strong positive correlation with COMP1, but a substantially lower correlation
with RES1. Another interesting observation one can make is the very weak correlation between
Ashare and RES1. This suggests that RES1 may in fact be picking up “across the board” factors
that cause aggregate TFP to be low in contrast to factors that should move inputs (sector speciﬁc
barriers, relative productivity levels and so forth).
<Table 2 Here>
The decomposition of TFP is undertaken the same way as done in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare










Table 3, column (1) below lists each of the terms in the above expression. Attributing half of
the covariance to each of the two components, COMP1 can easily account for about 85% of the
variation in TFP diﬀerences while RES1 explains only 15%. The most pessimistic allocation would
be to contribute all of the negative movements in the covariance to COMP1. Even then, the
composition eﬀect explains as much as 56% of the total variation in aggregate TFP. To check for
the sensitivity of the results, we removed Cameroon and New Zealand (the two countries with
extreme relative productivity). Column (2) shows that there is really no change in the role of
composition eﬀects. As an additional sensitivity check, we dropped all OECD countries. Needless
to say this does reduce some of the variation observed in the data but, as displayed in Column (3),
we ﬁnd only a modest drop in the share that is accounted for by COMP: to about 78%. Finally, we
limited the sample to just OECD countries. The variation now motivated by the composition term
drops considerably to 46%. This is of course to be expected. These are all countries that have low
agricultural shares to begin with.9 Nevertheless, these results clearly suggest an important role for
the output structure of the economy.
<Table 3 Here>
Despite these encouraging results, one might still be concerned with the treatment of κ and η.
We tackle these issues next.
There has been some progress towards estimating the stock of capital in the agricultural sector.
In particular Crego, Larson, Butzer and Mundlak (1997) have estimated the ﬁxed capital stock
in agriculture for 62 countries for various years covering the period 1967-92. In addition to ﬁxed
capital stocks in agriculture, they also estimated ﬁxed capital stocks in manufacturing and the
9Within this group Turkey has the highest share in agriculture at 18%. This is almost twice that of the next
country, Greece (10%). Turkey also has the lowest relative productivity at 0.25. The sample correlation between
agricultural share of output and relative agricultural productivity is -0.53 (22 observations).
8entire economy.10 The estimates of the latter are independent from those of ours (and hence
also of HJ) and therefore it is easy to compare the reliability of the former’s data, at least for the
economy-wide measures. A simple correlation between the two data sets for the year 1985 produces
a correlation of 0.95 for a sample of 53 countries. A regression (with the constant suppressed) of
the Crego et al numbers on our numbers yield a coeﬃcient of 0.93. Figure 2 plots the logarithm
of ﬁxed capital per worker for both the series. The strong correlation is quite obvious.
<Figure 2 Here>
As a result we proceeded to do a second decomposition where κ
α
1−α is moved to the COMP term.
We now have a more accurate composition eﬀect, which we label “COMP2”, and a correspondingly






The decomposition results are presented in Table 4. We are now limited to a much smaller
number of countries with the truncation taking place mainly at the lower end of the income
distribution. Out of the 46 countries for which we have data, 19 (or 40%) are OECD countries.
Despite that, the table suggests that the variance in COMP2 can explain around 60% of the
variance in aggregate TFP. Columns (1) through (4) replicate the sample classiﬁcation of Table
3. In Column (2) we drop New Zealand (data is no longer available for Cameroon) which hardly
alters the results. In Column (3) we have only non OECD countries and in Column (4) we have
only OECD countries. As before, once we restrict the sample to OECD countries the role of the
composition eﬀect is reduced but it remains sizeable.
When comparing Table 3 and 4 it is clear that once κ is taken into account we are forced to
reduce the underlying country coverage by almost half. How much of the change in results are
simply due to this reduction? To check this we conducted a decomposition in terms of COMP1 and
RES1 (rather than COMP2 and RES2) but for the smaller sample where data on κ is available.
The results are reported in Column 5, and they are virtually identical to the results reported in
Column 1. Hence the reduction in the share accounted for by COMP is actually not produced by
correcting for the allocation of capital. It is almost entirely driven by the reduction in the overall
sample size. As a result one is still in a position to conclude that the composition eﬀect is of
substantial importance in accounting for aggregate TFP diﬀerences.
<Table 4 here>
As a ﬁnal exercise we attempt to correct for human capital. Regrettably, we have been unable
to ﬁnd any research that provides intersectoral data on schooling (average years of schooling,
schooling completion rates or even literacy rates). Not surprisingly, some of the recent work on
intersectoral diﬀerences tend to ignore human capital completely (for example, Gollin, Parente
10In addition to ﬁxed agricultural capital they also estimate a broader measure of capital stock which includes
livestock and orchards (treestock). The aggregate ﬁxed capital stock in their estimates is greater than the sum of
ﬁxed capital stocks in agriculture and manufacturing, leaving room for other sectors. That is, the three series are
independent estimates.
9and Rogerson, 2004; Graham and Temple, 2004; Restuccia, Yang and Zhu, 2004; Vollrath, 2004).
However, in Caselli (2004) a simple correction is proposed which is outlined below. Given the lack
of any other precedent, we redo our estimates following basically his approach.
In the development accounting literature, the widely adopted practice is now to use microeco-
nomic based Mincerian returns and combine them with Barro-Lee (1999) estimates of schooling.
What this implies is that the average human capital per worker in the economy can be calculated
using a formula such as
h =e x p
¡
φpup + φsus + φτuτ
¢
,
where φp,φ s and φτ represent the returns to an additional year of schooling at primary, secondary
and higher levels, whereas up,u s and uτ represent the average years of schooling for an economy
a te a c ho ft h e s el e v e l s .T h i si st h ea p p r o a c hf o l l o w e db yH J .S i n c ew eh a v ea p p l i e dt h e i rh u m a n
capital numbers to calculate aggregate TFP, we stick with this approach.11
In following HJ we assume φp =0 .139 (i.e. 13.9%), φs =0 .101,φ τ =0 .068 for all countries.
We initially follow Caselli (2004) by assuming that labor in agriculture is completely uneducated;
zero years of schooling at any level. Hence, if average human capital in the agricultural sector
is denoted by ha, then clearly ha =1given this assumption. The average human capital in the
non-agricultural sector is then easy to derive. First note that the average human capital in the
labor force, h,m u s tb yd e ﬁnition be:
h = haλa + hna (1 − λa),













where h is the average stock of human capital from Hall and Jones.
What can we expect for η? In countries with very low agricultural labor shares η ≈ 1,w h e r e a s
η will tend to be larger than 1 in economies with very large agricultural labor shares (λa close to
1).12 Hence, obviously η will be highly, and negatively, correlated with GDP per worker (and by
extension aggregate TFP).
Table 5A lists the results of this new decomposition. In doing this decomposition we have
ignored diﬀerences in κ, given their observed lack of importance.
<Table 5A Here>
11In contrast, Caselli (2004) uses a slightly diﬀerent approach by assuming h =e x p {φu}, where u is average
years of schooling.
12In our calculations the US and UK have the lowest values for η — a few decimal points higher than 1.
10As can be seen from the table the roles of the composition term and the residual have been
switched. It is now the residual which explains more than 60% of the variation in aggregate Total
Factor Productivity. This result remains true even when we drop all OECD countries (column 3)
and of course gets further accentuated when we focus only on OECD countries.
Why do the results change so much? The most probable reason is that COMP1 and η are neg-
atively correlated (recall COMP3=COMP1×η). As we saw from Table 2, COMP1 and aggregate
TFP are positively correlated. As just explained, η and aggregate TFP are negatively correlated
(cf Table 2: the correlation between TFP and agriculture’s share is about -0.8). Hence, η and
COMP1 will tend to move in opposite directions. Indeed, the correlation between them is -0.2
(for the 74 countries in Column 1). Not surprisingly then the variation in COMP3 will be much
lower than the variation in COMP1 and thus the former will have a relatively more limited role in
explaining aggregate TFP diﬀerences.
One take on these results would be that the burgeoning literature which argues that intersectoral
factors play an important role in explaining TFP diﬀerences would do well to consider the role
of human capital diﬀerences across sectors. Another take is that this approach to measuring the
allocation of human capital is too crude. Certainly it is hard to escape a lurking feeling that average
years of schooling in agriculture may well be greater than zero, even in the poorer countries of the
world.
As a ﬁnal robustness check we therefore tried another round of decompositions, but simply
raised the average years of schooling in agriculture to 2 years (half the duration of primary school-
ing). Given that the rate of return for the ﬁrst four years is 13.9%, this means that human capital
in the agricultural sector is
hA =e x p ( 0 .139 ∗ 2) = 1.32.




Table 5B lists the decomposition results when this human capital allocation is applied. It seems
that a small adjustment has had a major impact. Once again the composition eﬀect seems to be
k e y ;e x c e p ti nt h ec a s eo fO E C Dc o u n t r i e s( a se x p e c ted). Unfortunately the covariance is negative
and much higher in numerical magnitude, making any conclusion sensitive to its division between
the two variance terms. Hence its diﬃcult not to be left with the clear impression that further
work on examining the role of human capital, in an intersectoral context, would be worthwhile.
<Table 5B Here>
The overall conclusion from the decompositions is that the allocation of inputs across sectors
seems to of ﬁrst order importance. In a broad sample of countries the contribution of the COMP
term in accounting for aggregate TFP is at the very least 40% and possibly as high as 85%. This
ﬁnding naturally fuels an interest in trying to discern what might be driving the composition in
the ﬁrst place. In the next section we take a ﬁrst pass at examining this question.
113 Regression Analysis
Having shown that a substantial fraction of the variation in measured aggregate total factor pro-
ductivity can be attributed to composition eﬀects, we next undertake some econometric exercises
to investigate how it is determined. In explaining the components of aggregate TFP we implement
a very parsimonious speciﬁcation, inspired by previous research. Hall and Jones (1999) where the
ﬁrst study which attempted to explain empirically observed variation in GDP per worker, and its
components: Capital-output ratios, human capital stocks and TFP.
Their key ﬁnding is that of a highly signiﬁcant impact from “Social Infrastructure”. The vari-
able is the mean of the Sachs and Warner index of openness to international trade (YrsOpen)
and a measure of “Government Anti-Diversionary Policy” (GADP) — a composite average of ﬁve
variables published in the International Country Risk Guide that measure country risk for interna-
tional investors. The latter group of ﬁve variables were introduced into the literature by Knack and
Keefer (1995). Hall and Jones were attempting to construct a variable that could adequately re-
ﬂect “institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within which
economic individuals accumulate skills, [and] ﬁrms accumulate capital and produce output.” Of
course the average of the GADP variable and the Sachs-Warner variable is only a proxy for what
constitutes SOCINF. We would like to examine whether the composition of output in the economy
is driven by SOCINF. That is, essentially perform a simple channeling analysis of the HJ ﬁnding.
More recently Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) (AC) have extended the analysis by HJ, with particular
attention paid to the importance of trade for diﬀerences in GDP per worker, and its underlying
components. The particular new element in AC’s analysis consists of introducing a novel measure
of trade: “Real Trade”. In previous research the trade variable of choice has been nominal imports
plus exports, as a fraction of nominal GDP (Frankel and Romer, 1999). AC argues that a problem
with this measure is that it is aﬀected by relative price changes between tradeables and non-
tradeables. Simply put, if increasing specialization leads to an increase in the relative price of
non-tradeables, through the well-known Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect, nominal trade to GDP may
in fact decline; even though trade has increased and extended the degree of specialization. As
a result, they suggest an alternative measure of trade which should be resistant towards this
problem: nominal trade to PPP GDP or REAL TRADE. They ﬁnd that real trade, once properly
instrumented, explains GDP per worker as well as aggregate TFP. Consequently, we also include
this measure of trade as an alternative to the Sachs and Warner index.13 Throughout we use the
GADP variable to proxy for institutions. Finally, inspired by AC — who in turn cite Ades and
Glaesar (1999) and Alesina et al (2000) — we include controls for the size of the market measured
by log population size (logPoP) and country size (logArea).
In sum, our baseline speciﬁcation is on the form
logZ = γ0 + γ1GADP + γ2Trade+ γ3 logPOP + γ4 logArea + ε, (10)
13Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) criticizes the latter index as as a measure of trade. In the original HJ analysis,
however, the authors do seem to rather think of the Sachs-Warner index as a measure of distortionary policies,
rather than as a measure of trade per se.
12where Z =TFP in 1985, the composition eﬀect and the residual, “Trade” is either YrsOpen or
REALTRADE; and ε is noise. In some speciﬁcations we will include HJ’s SOCINF instead of the
corresponding elements (GADP and YrsOpen). Also, inspired by AC we will, in some speciﬁcations,
add continent controls.14 In order to get as large a country coverage as possible we use COMP1
and RES1 as our dependent variables. Below we also comment on the results from examining
COMP2 and RES2.
Table 6 reports correlations between key variables included in the analysis. A noteworthy
feature of the correlation matrix is the relatively high positive correlation between COMP and
Real trade, YrsOpen and GADP. In contrast, the correlation between our measure of institutions
and the residual is in fact negative. The same goes for the association between RES and the trade
variables.
>Table 6 <
In Table 7A and 7B we report the results from estimating equation (10) by OLS. The ﬁrst three
columns in Table 7A reexamine the impact of SOCINF on aggregate TFP in 1985.
>Table 7A and 7B<
As in HJ’s study the variable is strongly and positively related to TFP. Splitting SOCINF into
GADP and YrsOpen reveal that only the former is signiﬁcantly related to TFP. In column 3 we
substitute YrsOpen for AC’s trade measure. The required data for REAL TRADE leads to the loss
of 3 observations. As seen, REAL TRADE is signiﬁcant in explaining TFP. It is also interesting
to note that the size of population turns signiﬁcant once the alternative trade variable is included.
This is consistent with theories arguing in favor of signiﬁcant scale eﬀects on the level of output
per worker. The change in signiﬁcance is likely due to the fact that large countries tend to trade
less (cf. Table 6). Hence, without controlling for trade, the scale variable may simultaneously be
picking up a detrimental impact on TFP (less trade) and a positive impact (size of the market);
thereby rendering it insigniﬁcant in column 1 and 2. In the remaining three columns of Table 7A
and in Table 7B, we repeat this batch of regressions though substituting the dependent variable for
COMP and RES. Overall, it seems that institutions and trade are more strongly related to COMP
rather than RES. Taken at face value this would suggest that institutions and trade work so as
to lower ineﬃciencies in the allocation of inputs across sectors, which in turn stimulates aggregate
TFP.
A potential problem with the regressions above is that they are likely to suﬀer from simultaneity
bias. HJ and AC stress this issue in the context of social infrastructure and trade, respectively.
Therefore we need instruments for both social infrastructure and trade. Since our hypothesis is
that institutions and trade determine the composition of output, there is no reason why we cannot
14In general the continent controls are not all signiﬁcant. Hence we select the controls following a method suggested
by AC (see footnote 9 in their paper). The method consists of eliminating the most insigniﬁcant controls sequentially
until each remaining continent control is signiﬁcant at 10%.
13use the same variables as instruments as HJ for SOCINF. Similarly, we adopt the instrument for
REALTRADE constructed by AC.
The instruments we selected include a) the fraction of the population speaking one of Western
Europe’s ﬁve main languages including English (EURFRAC), b) the absolute value of the latitude
(ABSLAT) c) the logarithm of predicted trade share of an economy based on a gravity model that
only uses a country’s geographical and population ﬁgures (LOGFR and LogAC, respectively) and
d) A measure of long run existence of formal governments (STATEHIST).15 The ﬁrst three variables
come from Hall and Jones and were used to instrument SOCINF (except for LogAC, which is the
ﬁtted trade share constructed by AC, used to instrument for REAL TRADE). STATEHIST comes
from Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002).16 This variable measures the length and coverage
of formal states in current geographical borders over the past 2 millennia. The motivation is that a
long experience with formal bureaucracies can lead to a greater stock of institutional capital which
might position some countries more favorably than others in framing appropriate legal systems,
property rights etc. Since the variable is based on actual histories from 1-1950 CE it is free of
problems of reverse causality. Further Bockstette et al. show that it is a better instrument for
social infrastructure than most of the instruments suggested by Hall and Jones. This is conﬁrmed
in Table 8, where STATEHIST is signiﬁcant in explaining both SOCINF and YrsOpen (as well as
REAL TRADE).
<Table 8 Here>
It is less successful in explaining the institutional variable GADP, however17. Another note-
worthy feature is that logAC is strongly related to REAL TRADE. In all cases our instruments
are jointly highly signiﬁcant determinants of the endogenous variables.
Table 9A and 9B shows the results from estimating equation (10) by 2SLS. The ﬁrst three
columns recover results similar to those of HJ- SOCINF and its underlying elements are signiﬁ-
cant in explaining aggregate TFP. The table also lists the p-values for Hansen’s test statistic for
overidentifying restrictions. The values imply that the null hypothesis of orthogonality cannot be
rejected.
The 3rd speciﬁcation is inspired by AC’s set of controls. We also ﬁnd trade and population to be
signiﬁcant determinants of TFP. In magnitudes we ﬁnd a smaller impact from REAL TRADE (.45
compared to 1.3), and a smaller impact from population (.17 compared with .34).18 This diﬀerence
15Hall and Jones also used another variable, ENGFRAC, the fraction of the population that speaks English, as
an instrumental variable. However, we ultimately dropped this variable, since, in our initial investigations, keeping
this variable in the set of instruments led to poor identiﬁcation results. Further, the variable fared poorly in terms
of predictive power in the ﬁrst stage regressions.
16Bockstette et al create diﬀerent values for STATEHIST using diﬀerent rates for “discounting the past”. The
variable here uses a 5% rate of discounting- the same that is used for all the econometric exercises in their paper.
17In another paper, Chanda and Putterman (2004) show that STATEHIST might have a negative eﬀect on recent
measures of institutional quality but a positive eﬀect on post war economic growth. They speculate that this might
be because high STATEHIST countries (mainly within LDC’s) experienced a “reversal of fortune” (Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2002) but have probably been more successful in catching up after gaining independence
compared to low STATEHIST countries.
18Cf Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), Table 6.
14is likely caused by (a) smaller data coverage in the present context, (b) we use a diﬀerent measure of
institutions compared with AC’s speciﬁcation. In fact, whereas AC ﬁnd their institutional measure
to be insigniﬁcant, GADP turns out to be signiﬁcant in column 3.
Turning to the key results of this section, which are reported in columns 4-6 and in Table
9b. The overriding theme of the results is that both institutions and trade seem to be signiﬁcant
determinants of COMP. The YrsOpen policy variable is not signiﬁcant however. In contrast we ﬁnd
little evidence of either institutions or trade having an impact on the remaining residual. These
ﬁndings suggest that a critical manifestation of institutions and trade may be that they matter
for the allocation of inputs across sectors, and that they thereby aﬀect aggregate TFP. In addition
the size of the market seems also to matter for the composition eﬀect, as reﬂected by the highly
signiﬁcant inﬂuence from the size of population.
In order to test the robustness of these ﬁndings we also ran the same set of regressions using
COMP2 and RES2, whereby capital is also part of the COMP term (available upon request). In
reduced form 2SLS we continue to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of institutions and trade on aggregate
TFP in 1985, though the data set is limited to only 45 countries. However, while GADP continues to
work its way through the composition eﬀect, REAL TRADE now turns signiﬁcant in the regression
where RES is the left hand side variable. Since, in this sample, almost half the countries are OECD
where the size of the agricultural sector is modest, this new ﬁnding may simply be consistent with
the notion that trade matters for the adoption of technologies — thus stimulating TFP. Still, even
in this smaller sample GADP remains signiﬁcant in explaining, not RES, but COMP.
These ﬁndings can be viewed as supportive of a number of diﬀerent theories on productivity
diﬀerences. For example, Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2005) present a theory of how institutional
innovation (public schooling) may be blocked by the landed elite thus hampering industrialization
and thereby over-all productivity. Since institutions matter for the sectoral composition of the
economy, according to this theory, it would implicitly stipulate a link between aggregate TFP
and the quality of (human capital promoting) institutions. Likewise, the ﬁnding of a conducive
eﬀect of scale provides some evidence in favor of theories which leaves a major role for the size of
the market in spurring industrialization. Of course, it is at this stage not possible to distinguish
between diﬀerent mechanisms, such as coordination failures (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy et
al, 1989), externalities (e.g Temple and Graham, 2004), ﬁxed costs (e.g. Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2004)
and so on.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Prescott’s (1998) call for a theory of total factor productivity has been accompanied by a large
body of research which attributes diﬀerences in output per worker to technological diﬀerences
(often assumed to be the same as TFP) generated by institutional barriers and, not unrelated,
geographical factors, which hamper the adoption of socially proﬁtable innovations. However, ar-
guing that aggregate TFP is solely determined by technological factors is almost certainly wrong.
15As Robert Solow (2001, p.285, 287) recently put it:
It is certainly unwise to suggest that all economies are equally eﬃcient at reallocating
inputs across sectors. This diﬀerence will be reﬂected in A(t), and maybe not only there
[...] the non-technological sources of diﬀerences in TFP may be more important than the
technological ones. Indeed, they may control the technological ones, especially in developing
countries.
In this paper we have tried to take this observation one step further, by asking whether this
inﬂuence is of any quantitative importance. We believe it is. Speciﬁcally we have demonstrated that
as i g n i ﬁcant fraction of the observed variation in measured TFP is attributable to the allocation
of inputs and diﬀerences in technologies across sectors, and furthermore, that the eﬃciency with
which inputs are channeled to high productivity sectors is strongly aﬀected by the institutional
environment of individual economies, the extent of trade and size of the market (proxied by the size
of population). In sum, it seems that in order to provide a rigorous theory of cross-country total
factor productivity diﬀerences, a theory of output’s structural composition will be an important
component.
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195T a b l e s
Table 1: Summary Statistics19
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Agricultural Share 74 0.09 0.07 0.007 0.279
Relative Productivity 74 0.21 0.26 0.004 1.44
HJ-TFP (rel to USA) 74 0.57 0.29 0.10 1.24
COMP1(rel to USA) 74 0.62 0.30 0.09 1.05
RES1 (rel to USA) 74 1.01 0.51 0.35 3.73
Table 2: Correlations20
(n=74)
AShare RPROD HJ—TFP COMP1 RES1
AShare 1 ... ... ... ...
RPROD -0.17 1 ... ... ...
HJ-TFP -0.78 0.42 1 ... ...
COMP1 -0.72 0.55 0.79 1 ...
RES1 -0.005 -0.25 0.22 -0.41 1
Table 3: Variance Decomposition21
Shares 1 2 3 4
Var(COMP1) share 1.14 1.12 1.15 0.47
Var(RES1) share 0.44 0.42 0.59 0.54
Cov(COMP1, RES1) share -0.29 -0.27 -0.37 -0.01
Implied Share of COMP1 0.85 0.85 0.78 0.46
Implied Share of RES1 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.53
N 7 47 25 22 2
19The sample of 74 countries exclude countries in transition (formerly communist) and those with a mining sector
greater than 15% of GDP.
20For HJ-TFP, COMP and RES1 we used logged values in calculating correlations. This is meaningful since the
variance decomposition exercise undertaken later also requires the use of logs.
21Column (1) excludes all transition countries and those with mining shares greater than 15% of GDP. Column(2)
additionally drops Cameroon and New Zealand. Column (3) restricts the sample to non OECD countries with
mining shares less than 15% and not in transition.. Column (4) uses only OECD countries with mining shares less
than 15% and not in transition.
Implied Shares are calculated by allocating the covariance equally to COMP1 and RES1.
20Table 4: Variance Decomposition22
Shares 1 2 3 4 5
Var(COMP2) share 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.51 0.64
Var(RES2) share 0.33 0.33 0.41 0.53 0.31
Cov(COMP2, RES2) share 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Implied Share of COMP2 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.49 0.66
Implied Share of RES2 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.51 0.33
N 4 64 52 71 94 6
Table 5A: Variance Decomposition23
(With Human Capital)
Shares 1 2 3 4
Var(COMP3) share 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.14
Var(RES3) share 0.58 0.57 0.72 0.72
Cov(COMP3, RES3) share 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.07
Implied Share of COMP3 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.21
Implied Share of RES3 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.79
N 7 47 25 22 2
Table 5B: Variance Decomposition24
(With Human Capital)
Shares 1 2 3 4
Var(COMP3) share 0.97 0.95 1.06 0.29
Var(RES3) share 0.64 0.62 0.87 0.66
Cov(COMP3, RES3) share -0.30 -0.28 -0.47 0.02
Implied Share of COMP3 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.31
Implied Share of RES3 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.68
N7 1 6 9 4 9 2 2
22Column (1) excludes all transition countries and those with mining shares greater than 15% of GDP. Column(2)
additionally drops New Zealand. Column (3) restricts the sample to non OECD countries with mining shares less
than 15% and not in transition.. Column (4) uses only OECD countries with mining shares less than 15% and not
in transition.
Implied Shares are calculated by allocating the covariance equally to COMP2 and RES2.
23Column (1) excludes all transition countries and those with mining shares greater than 15% of GDP. Column(2)
additionally drops New Zealand. Column (3) restricts the sample to non OECD countries with mining shares less
than 15% and not in transition.. Column (4) uses only OECD countries with mining shares less than 15% and not
in transition.
Implied Shares are calculated by allocating the covariance equally to COMP3 and RES3.
24Column (1) excludes all transition countries and those with mining shares greater than 15% of GDP. Column(2)
additionally drops New Zealand. Column (3) restricts the sample to non OECD countries with mining shares less
than 15% and not in transition.. Column (4) uses only OECD countries with mining shares less than 15% and not
in transition.
Implied Shares are calculated by allocating the covariance equally to COMP3 and RES3.
Notice that the sample is smaller than in Table 5A. This is because assuming average years of schooling of 2 in
agriculture is incompatible with the very low average years of schooling in aggregate for some countries.
21Table 6: Correlation matrix for selected variables25
123 45 6 7 8
logA85 logComp logRes GADP YrsOpen LogRealTrade logPop logArea
logA85 1.00
logComp 0.80 1.00
logRes 0.20 -0.42 1.00
GADP 0.53 0.61 -0.20 1.00
YrsOpen 0.48 0.57 -0.21 0.69 1.00
LogRealTrade 0.39 0.42 -0.11 0.66 0.57 1.00
logPop 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.32 1.00
logArea 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.27 0.57 1.00
25The deﬁnition and sources of the variables are given in the text. The correlations are calculated for 69 countries
where all necessary data are available.
22Table 7A: OLS Regressions26
123 4 5 6
Dependent variable





















































Continent controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 7 27 26 9 7 2 7 2 6 9
R2 0.32 0.34 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.74
































Continent controls No No Yes
N7 2 7 2 6 9
R2 0.07 0.07 0.37
26All regressions contain a constant term. Absolute t-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors.
Continent controls included: Latin America, South Asia and Middle East/North Africa. Note: *,**,*** means
signiﬁcant and 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
23Table 8: First stage regressions27
123 4 5
Dependent variable







































































Continent controls No No Yes No Yes
N 7 27 26 9 7 2 6 9












27All regressions contain a constant term. Absolute t-values in parantheses, based on robust standard errors.
Continent controls included: Latin America, South Asia and Middle East/North Africa. Note: *,**,*** means
signiﬁcant and 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. R2 refers to the centered R2.
24Table 9A: 2SLS regressions28
123 4 5 6
Dependent variable























































Continent controls No No Yes No No Yes
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28All regressions contain a constant term. Absolute t-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors.
Continent controls included: Latin America, South Asia and Middle East/North Africa. Instruments are: State
history, Eurfrac, , absolute lattitude and ﬁtted trade share. In column 1, 2, 4 and 5 it derives from Frankel and
Romer (1999), in Column 3 and 6 the ﬁtted trade share is from Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). Note: *,**,*** means
signiﬁcant and 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
29All regressions contain a constant term. Absolute t-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors.
Continent controls included: Latin America, South Asia and Middle East/North Africa. Instruments are: State
history, Eurfrac, , absolute lattitude and ﬁtted trade share. In column 1, 2 it derives from Frankel and Romer
(1999), in Column 3 the ﬁtted trade share is from Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). Note: *,**,*** means signiﬁcant and



































Figure 1: Countries Arranged in Order of Relative Productivity (Labor Productivity in Agriculture





































































































6 8 10 12
PWT based Capital per Worker (1985)
Figure 2: Comparing Capital per Worker (1985) Estimates
26